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Abstract 44 
Internal and external food safety audits are conducted to assess the safety and quality of 45 
food including on-farm production, manufacturing practices, sanitation, and hygiene. 46 
Some auditors are direct stakeholders that are employed by food establishments to 47 
conduct internal audits, while other auditors may represent the interests of a second-48 
party purchaser or a third-party auditing agency. Some buyers conduct their own 49 
audits or additional testing, while some buyers trust the results of third-party audits or 50 
inspections.  Third-party auditors, however, use various food safety audit standards 51 
and most do not have a vested interest in the products being sold. Audits are conducted 52 
under a proprietary standard, while food safety inspections are generally conducted 53 
within a legal framework. There have been many foodborne illness outbreaks linked to 54 
food processors that have passed third-party audits and inspections, raising questions 55 
about the utility of both. Supporters argue third-party audits are a way to ensure food 56 
safety in an era of dwindling economic resources. Critics contend that while external 57 
audits and inspections can be a valuable tool to help ensure safe food, such activities 58 
represent only a snapshot in time. This paper identifies limitations of food safety 59 
inspections and audits and provides recommendations for strengthening the system, 60 
based on developing a strong food safety culture, including risk-based verification 61 
steps, throughout the food safety system. 62 
 63 
1.0 Introduction 64 
 65 
Billions of meals are prepared safely each day throughout the world. The commercial 66 
food system relies on audits and inspections to assess the practices and processes used 67 
to by food producers at each step in the production chain. Yet when outbreaks of 68 
foodborne illness happen, the results can be emotionally, physically and financially 69 
devastating to the victims and the businesses involved. Many outbreaks involve firms 70 
that have had their food production systems verified and received acceptable ratings 71 
from food safety auditors or government inspectors. 72 
 73 
Food safety audits and inspections are one activity used to verify that a food producer 74 
or individual is following specific guidelines, requirements or rules. Audits involve a 75 
“systematic and independent examination to determine whether quality/safety 76 
activities and related results comply with planned arrangements and whether these 77 
arrangements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives” 78 
(ANZFA, 2001; ANZFA was later morphed into Food Standards Australia New 79 
Zealand). Planned arrangements, as defined by the Australia New Zealand Food 80 
Authority are commonly referred to as standards within the food industry. The 81 
difference between inspections and audits is that an inspection evaluates “conformity 82 
by measuring, observing, testing or gauging the relevant characteristics”(ANZFA, 83 
2001). Audits are one tool to help ensure adherence to recognized regulations and good 84 
manufacturing practices. 85 
  86 
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An audit of food safety practices, facilities, documentation and written procedures is 87 
used to gather information regarding food production and processing practices being 88 
followed by a particular producer, identifying areas for improvement and areas that are 89 
deficient (ANZFA, 2001). Audit reports, in theory, serve as the “eyes and ears” for an 90 
organization buying food from a supplier (Weise, 2010). There are several types of 91 
audits, and a variety of audit organizations, each with their own unique or common 92 
food safety guidelines.  93 
 94 
Self-audits are internal audits performed by a food establishment itself.  These 95 
businesses usually have a quality assurance team that leads the internal audits. These 96 
internal audits may have good potential for reducing risk if the methods followed are 97 
those outlined in widely accepted codes and risk assessment guidance documents. The 98 
effectiveness of internal audits is also assessed during third-party audits. Second-party 99 
audits are audits that a downstream company, or buyer, performs on their supplier. 100 
Third-party audits are performed by an outside firm that usually focuses entirely on 101 
verification or standard implementation to ensure that a buyer’s rules are being 102 
followed (Costa, 2010). Third-party audits examine compliance with laws and codes of 103 
practice as well as provide “insight into management controls and supervision” (Costa, 104 
2010).  105 
 106 
2.0 The role of audits in food safety 107 
 108 
Third-party audits are one part of a multi-factorial approach to food safety. The 109 
popularity of third-party audits has increased corresponding to a shift in food safety 110 
governance away from government regulation and inspection towards the 111 
development of private food safety standards (Busch, 2011).   112 
 113 
Standard setting organizations (e.g. International Organization for Standardization 114 
(ISO) and the British Retail Consortium [BRC]) include industry consortia, private 115 
voluntary associations and buyers.  There are many different food safety standards 116 
available to food producers and manufacturers even within a single industry segment. 117 
While the various standards are voluntary, demand by buyers essentially makes 118 
certification or verification under these standards de facto mandatory for food 119 
companies that want to continue to sell their product to major retailers (Busch, 2011). 120 
This has created a system for enforcing food safety standards without significantly 121 
increasing burden on taxpayers.  122 
 123 
In addition, if a company such as Walmart wanted specific standards for a product, 124 
even if it exceeded U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards, the company 125 
would demand that from the auditor -- and get it (Prevor, 2009). 126 
 127 
While inspectors play an active role in overseeing compliance, the burden for food 128 
safety lies primarily with food producers (GAO, 2008). Inspection efforts, even if 129 
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doubled, would not be enough to make sure every food item is safe. Third party audits 130 
provide the data upon which certification and buying decisions are made, and are now 131 
a popular choice for retailers who use them to push the responsibility (and costs) for 132 
food safety and quality back on to the supplier (Steir, 2009). Audits are an attempt to 133 
move beyond inspections that are point-in-time observations of activities and practices.  134 
Audits focus on the procedures in place to achieve food safety outcomes and look for 135 
evidence that they are being followed and are appropriate and capable of reducing risk.  136 
There is also increasing focus on assessment of food safety culture and management 137 
commitment to food safety.  138 
 139 
Third-party audits also benefit individual companies and supply chains. It has been 140 
argued that the best use of third-party audits is to focus on strengthening self-audit 141 
methods and operational controls to achieve safer food (Costa, 2010).For some, it is a 142 
genuine desire to improve food safety, quality and sanitation or a way to 143 
solve/troubleshoot existing problems (Steir, 2009).  For others it is a potential marketing 144 
advantage or a customer requirement. The effectiveness of these audits may link to the 145 
motivation behind the audit.  It has been determined that creating a food safety culture 146 
is imperative to an effective food safety risk management system (Powell et al., 2011; 147 
Yiannas, 2008).  Companies with a strong food safety culture may be more likely to 148 
obtain a third party audit because they want to improve operations, not just because of 149 
customer demand.  Companies with a strong food safety culture are also likely to use 150 
audit results as guidance and opportunity to improve their practices.  Audits -- first- 151 
second- or third-party -- are another tool for companies to enhance safe food 152 
production. 153 
 154 
What is not clear is the role of third party audits in reducing the risk of contaminated 155 
food reaching the marketplace and the ability of auditors to identify problems or high-156 
risk operations.  The utility of third party audits has been examined in other industries 157 
as well. A 10-year study on workplace safety on U.S. railroads found that high audit 158 
scores partially correlated with improved legislative compliance but did not necessarily 159 
correspond to improved safety performance (Peterson, 2001). This indicated there were 160 
problems somewhere in the system and that the audit process was not necessarily valid 161 
for that industry. 162 
 163 
3.0 Limitations of audits 164 
 165 
Audit systems, in their current form, have limitations in improving food safety.  There 166 
are no current empirical evaluations that look at the correlation between audit scores 167 
and foodborne illness outbreaks but there is a long and storied history of food safety 168 
failures involving third-party audits. 169 
 170 
Third-party audits are analogous in many ways to regulatory municipal inspections of 171 
foodservice operations: the effectiveness of both audits and inspections is driven largely 172 
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by observational judgment and consistency of the inspector or auditor. Foodservice 173 
inspection is a cornerstone of local public health, yet inspection scores can be poor 174 
predictors of foodborne illness. Jones and colleagues (2004) examined over 160,000 175 
inspections in Tennessee over seven years and found no difference between scores of 176 
foodservices associated with outbreaks and those that were not. Similar results were 177 
previously found in Miami-Dade county (Cruz et al., 2001). In Massachusetts, 178 
researchers found that jurisdictions had different inspection criteria, and even within a 179 
given jurisdiction, a risk to one inspector may not be a risk to another (DeNucci 2007). 180 
 181 
Many foodborne illness outbreaks have been linked to farms, processors and retailers 182 
that went through some form of audit certification. The January 2009 outbreak of 183 
Salmonella Typhimurium linked to the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) has been 184 
frequently cited as an example of a failure in the third party auditing system (Busch, 185 
2011; Steir, 2009; Moss and Martin, 2009).  In  January, 2009 PCA recalled over 3,900 186 
peanut butter and other peanut-containing products from more than 350 companies 187 
(FDA, 2009b), 691 people were sickened and nine died across 46 U.S. states and in 188 
Canada (CDC, 2009a). 189 
 190 
Moss and Martin (2009) reported in the New York Times that an auditor with AIB was 191 
responsible for evaluating the safety of products produced by PCA. The peanut 192 
company knew in advance when the auditors were arriving. “The overall food safety 193 
level of this facility was considered to be: SUPERIOR,” the auditor concluded in his 194 
March 27, 2008, report for AIB. A copy of the audit was obtained by the Times. AIB was 195 
not alone in missing the trouble at the PCA plant in Blakely, Georgia. State inspectors 196 
also found only minor problems.  This outbreak and others highlight some of the 197 
limitations of both third party audits and government inspections which are included in 198 
Table I below. 199 
 200 
Table I – Limitations of Third Party Audits 201 
Audit 
Limitations 
Summary Example 
A snapshot 
in time 
Audits and inspections remain point-in-time 
assessments that represent a small fraction of 
food production time and volume. If conducted 
properly and the results acted upon, audits can 
reveal strengths and weaknesses in a food safety 
program, but cannot guarantee future 
performance. Further, auditors can only examine 
what a company provides, although skilled 
auditors know what to ask for and may be able 
to identify clues to systemic problems.   
PCA outbreak, a federal team of 
investigators later uncovered a 
number of alarming signs at the 
peanut plant including testing 
records from the company itself 
that showed Salmonella in its 
products as far back as June 2007 
(Martin, 2009) 
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Reliance on 
an effective 
standard 
The audit is only as effective as the standard 
against which the practices are being measured. 
Standards must be evidence-based, designed to 
address the commodity/product specific risks 
and practices and responsive to changing 
industry practices and new science as it becomes 
available. 
Cantaloupe outbreak, July 2011. 
Previous research had focused on 
Salmonella and current industry 
standards may not be robust 
enough to address risk from 
Listeria.   
Effective 
audit tool 
The audit tool (or audit checklist) must be 
valid. There is no scientific basis for 
certification/validation in audits (Mahshie, 
2009). There is high variability in the quality 
and reliability of audits and many different 
types of audit tools that vary in length, 
complexity, and style. A firm may pass some 
audits but still have a food safety risk factor 
Salmonella in eggs, Iowa, 2010, 
lead to 2,000 illnesses and the 
recall of 500 million eggs. DeCoster 
received a superior rating from AIB 
International, despite audit reports 
that are typically 10-20 pages and 
consider over 300 elements (AIB 
International, 2007). 
Auditor 
competence 
Audits require more than just a checklist, they 
require paying attention and thinking. The 
individual ability of an auditor has a significant 
impact on the outcome of the audit, most third-
party audits look for objective evidence to assess 
compliance, but effective auditors must be able 
to assess risk, particularly in unique situations 
and synthesize the information provided to 
determine effectiveness of the food safety 
management system 
In the aftermath of the PCA 
outbreak, the competency of both 
the auditor and the auditing firm 
were criticized. The auditor of the 
PCA facility was an experienced 
auditor but was an expert in fresh 
produce and was not aware that 
peanuts were susceptible to 
Salmonella (Moss and Martin, 
2009) 
Audit scope 
The audit scope must be broad enough to 
cover all operations, locations and products. 
When a company is presented with different 
price quotes they often choose the cheapest 
one, which is more likely the one with less 
audit time (Pronk, 2011). This reduces cost for 
the firm requesting the audit, and reduces the 
ability of the auditor to see all parts of a 
complex operation as well as the possibility of 
the auditor finding instances of non-
compliance. 
On June 28, 2007, Veggie Booty 
snack food was linked to an 
outbreak of Salmonella. The plant 
that made Veggie Booty had 
received a rating of “excellent” 
from AIB International, raising 
questions about the efficacy of 
auditors and audits, which, in this 
case and others, did not extend to 
ingredient suppliers (Moss & 
Martin, 2009).  
Conflict of 
Interest 
Almost all food producers/retailers require their suppliers to pay for their own audits. 
A company receiving a poor audit may be unwilling to hire that auditor again. Even 
with safeguards in place, auditing bodies still must rely on the honesty of their 
auditors to declare potential conflicts 
Follow-up 
Auditors have no legal authority and cannot demand records, embargo products or 
close an operation (Costa, 2011). Neither the auditor nor the audited company is 
required to report non-compliances, even automatic failures, to regulatory agencies. If 
the buyer does not review the audit report closely, which is often the case (Prevor, 
2011a), they may never know that their supplier had a serious non-conformance. 
 202 
In response to some of the criticisms around third party audits and standards and the 203 
growing number of private standards with no real oversight over their development, 204 
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the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) was launched in May, 2000. GFSI is a non-profit 205 
foundation managed by the consumer goods forum (GFSI, 2012). GFSI is a 206 
benchmarking system where “all recognized schemes have a common foundation of 207 
requirements which should provide consistent results, in regard to the common 208 
requirements applied during the audit, but the benchmarked schemes cannot be 209 
considered as equal” (GFSI, 2012). One objective of the initiative is to reduce costs 210 
within the system by reducing the number of different audits a firm requires for their 211 
different customers. The success of the GFSI approach has not been evaluated to date. 212 
 213 
 214 
4.0 Improving audits and inspections 215 
 216 
Food safety auditors and inspectors are an integral part of the food safety system, and 217 
their use will expand in the future, for both domestic and imported foodstuffs. 218 
Supporters of third-party audits argue this type of audit augments the efforts of food 219 
regulatory agencies, such as FDA, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), and 220 
others.  221 
 222 
Auditing can be helpful, in theory. Audit reports, are only useful if the purchaser or  223 
food producer them reviews the results, understands the risks addressed by the 224 
standards and makes risk-reduction decisions based on the results. From past examples, 225 
there appears to be a disconnect between what auditors provide (a snapshot) and what 226 
buyers believe they are doing (a full verification of product and process).  227 
 228 
Third-party auditing can also assist regulatory agencies by providing the extra 229 
assessment and data a regulatory agency might not be able to collect as often as 230 
required – but only if the data is shared with regulatory agencies. Audits and 231 
inspections can assist in the development of a food safety culture by dictating criteria 232 
for the sale of goods (Acheson, 2010). The training component for employees is another 233 
use of audits in the daily implementation of food safety practices (AIB International, 234 
2007). Third-party audits also provide “thousands of checks and balances to the food 235 
supply system with no direct cost to taxpayers” (AIB International, 2007). However, 236 
theory and practice can differ. 237 
 238 
Critics see many problems with the general way third-party audits are currently 239 
conducted and have described them as the equivalent of “mail-order diplomas” (Moss 240 
& Martin, 2009).  As far as being the “eyes and ears” for a company buying from the 241 
audited supplier, many problems are apparently missed during visits (Weise, 2010). 242 
Heavy reliance on prescriptive checklists may increase auditor consistency, allow for 243 
cost savings on training but also reduces their ability to assess risk. This ultimately 244 
results in a pool of auditors that are poorly qualified to assess the risks associated 245 
within individual operations. It is imperative for the food industry to aggressively take 246 
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corrective actions and make third-party audits and inspections more meaningful, more 247 
accurate, and to fully enhance the safety of consumers. 248 
 249 
Good auditors look beyond what is on their checklist and can synthesize the various 250 
pieces of information they get to put together a clear picture of whether the operation is 251 
doing what they say they are doing.  Certification bodies must also embrace a food 252 
safety culture, ensuring their auditors have the appropriate training, oversight, 253 
knowledge and support. 254 
 255 
In an effort to improve the third party audit system, FDA is working to establish 256 
accreditation programs under a new food safety law, to insure the quality of audits 257 
(Karst, 2011). FDA is also trying to make audit results accessible so they can analyze the 258 
results for effectiveness and reliability (Karst, 2011). FDA released guidance for industry 259 
in 2009 regarding voluntary third-party certification programs for foods and feeds 260 
(FDA, 2009a). In this document, it is clearly stated that industry has the primary 261 
responsibility to ensure that food products are safe and meet FDA requirements. The 262 
document outlines recommendations for third-party certification programs such as 263 
qualifications and training for auditors including coursework and field training. These 264 
recommendations, though helpful, are not “legally established responsibilities” and the 265 
extensive use of the word “should” in the document infers a recommendation rather 266 
than a requirement (FDA, 2009a). 267 
 268 
Third-party audits are only one performance indicator and need to be supplemented 269 
with microbial testing, second-party audits of suppliers and the in-house capacity to 270 
meaningfully assess the results of audits and inspections. Any and all raw product 271 
suppliers should be included in the audit scope. More effective audit systems 272 
incorporate unannounced visits along with supplemental information into their 273 
framework and require extensive documentation of internal audits, regulatory 274 
compliance, laboratory results and raw product certifications. 275 
 276 
Preventive measures such as instilling and enhancing a food safety culture, where there 277 
are shared values throughout the organization that support risk-reduction, may 278 
improve the safety of the food supply by supplying daily reminders, incentives and 279 
food safety priorities in the absence of inspectors or auditors. Improving and 280 
encouraging communication with front-line employees – any food producer is only as 281 
good as its worst front-line staff – can help mitigate high-risk situations such as at PCA, 282 
where employees said the facility was “a dump,” but did not report their concerns to 283 
officials before people became ill and died (Sharp, 2009). Audits, regulatory inspections 284 
and testing are an important part of the food safety system, but alone and individually 285 
they are not enough.  286 
 287 
Education and training are the focus of many food handling behavior interventions. 288 
However, research suggests that the impacts of food handler training programs are 289 
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often inconsistent, and program evaluation is rarely conducted (Almanza & Nesmith, 290 
2004; Egan et al., 2007; Frash et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2008). Measuring knowledge 291 
change is a poor indicator of changes in practices.  Yiannas (2008) points out the 292 
limitations of focusing entirely on training as food safety culture indicators and 293 
suggests training is just one factor of a good organization. Conscientious proprietors 294 
provide training and proper tools, remove barriers, and proceed with a focus on 295 
positive food safety behavior. The lack of food safety expertise within an organization 296 
to effectively evaluate and interpret audit or inspection results may compound 297 
problems. Standards applied by auditing firms and regulatory inspections often include 298 
training as a component, but outbreak history suggests that little evaluation of 299 
effectiveness is explored. 300 
 301 
Researchers have suggested that the only reliable measure of effectiveness of food 302 
safety culture-supporting intervention material is through the observation of food 303 
preparation practices (Redmond and Griffith, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Redmond et 304 
al., 2004; Chapman et al., 2010).   305 
 306 
In 2010, beef processor JBS started a trial using video cameras as part of their third-307 
party monitoring and auditing efforts (Crews, 2011). Strategically placed cameras 308 
recorded footage that could then be observed by auditors around-the-clock and random 309 
audits could then be conducted remotely. Not only does this allow for immediate 310 
feedback, it has also proven an effective training tool for employees, as they can observe 311 
and learn from watching themselves at work (Crews, 2011). Improvement at the pilot 312 
plant was seen in days instead of months and compliance rates consistently exceeded 313 
99%. Errors can be addressed almost immediately before problems develop (Crews, 314 
2011).   315 
 316 
Assessing food-handling practices of staff through internal observations, externally-led 317 
evaluations, and audit and inspection results can provide indicators of a food safety 318 
culture. Results of these evaluations can be used to modify interventions and further 319 
improve the organization’s culture of food safety (Mitchell et al, 2007). 320 
 321 
Since most commercial food establishments are audited or inspected, it remains likely 322 
that any food establishment that becomes associated with a foodborne illness outbreak 323 
will have had some type of audit in the past.  Audits still do not guarantee safe food 324 
and have inherent limitations based upon stakeholder involvement, auditor 325 
competence, audit scope, and audit system.  326 
 327 
In August 2008, Listeria monocytogenes-contaminated deli meats produced by Maple Leaf 328 
Foods, Inc. of Canada caused 57 illnesses and 22 deaths (Weatherill, 2009). A panel of 329 
international food safety experts convened by Maple Leaf Foods, Inc. to investigate the 330 
source of the deli meat contamination determined that the most probable contamination 331 
source was mechanical meat slicers that, despite cleaning according to the 332 
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manufacturer’s instructions, had meat residue trapped deep inside the slicing 333 
mechanisms (Weatherill, 2009). An independent investigative review commissioned by 334 
the Canadian federal government concluded that the focus on food safety was 335 
insufficient among senior management at both the company and the various 336 
government organizations involved before and during the outbreak; that insufficient 337 
planning had been undertaken to be prepared for a potential outbreak; and that those 338 
involved lacked a sense of urgency at the outset of the outbreak (Mason, 2009).  339 
 340 
The specific plant linked to the outbreak received satisfactory marks from federal 341 
inspectors for complying with federal regulatory requirements. They appeared to be 342 
doing everything right. Employees consistently addressed instances of non-compliance 343 
when they were identified. The plant’s management maintained all required records, 344 
ensured that staff training took place, and ensured the established quality assurance 345 
program was followed. At all plants, the company conducted environmental testing 346 
that went beyond regulatory requirements (Weatherill, 2009).  Prior to the outbreak, 347 
Maple Leaf Foods, Inc. conducted more than 3,000 environmental tests annually at the 348 
implicated plant and tested products monthly (McCain, 2009). Although no product 349 
tests revealed the presence of Listeria spp., a number of environmental samples detected 350 
the bacteria in the months before the public was alerted in August to possible 351 
contamination (CFIA, 2009; McCain, 2009). However, the company failed to recognize 352 
and identify the underlying cause of a sporadic yet persistent pattern of environmental 353 
test results that were positive for Listeria spp. and was not obliged to report these results. 354 
 355 
The use of audits to help create, improve, and maintain a genuine food safety culture 356 
holds the most promise in preventing foodborne illness and safeguarding public health. 357 
A common thread in all of the outbreaks described above is a clear lack of food safety 358 
culture among the implicated companies. In the E. coli outbreak in South Wales, a 359 
public inquiry into the outbreak by Professor Hugh Pennington (2009) found that, in 360 
addition to allowing cross contamination through the operation’s single vacuum 361 
packaging machine, butcher William Tudor encouraged ill employees to continue 362 
working in establishments and preparing meat for sale. Upon review of statements 363 
made by employees and environmental health officers to the police, of video and 364 
photographic evidence, and of management documentation, Professor Chris Griffith 365 
(2010), head of the food research and consultancy unit at the University of Wales 366 
Institute, Cardiff, told the inquiry the culture at the premises was one of little regard for 367 
the importance of food safety but where making and saving money was the priority. 368 
Health code violations at the abattoir were longstanding, repetitive and widely known 369 
among environmental health officers responsible for inspecting the operation. Although 370 
foodborne illness may not always be completely preventable, that the risk of a business 371 
causing foodborne illness is, to a large extent, a consequence of its own activities. Audit 372 
and inspection information must be leveraged into corrective actions to mitigate risk.   373 
 374 
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Food safety culture, not only within the company but also within a supply chain should 375 
also be emphasized.  In both the Odwalla and PCA outbreaks, second-party audits were 376 
able to identify problems the third party auditors did not.  Open communication 377 
between suppliers and buyers including expectations and risk management practices is 378 
essential.  Systems where retailers work with their suppliers to help them achieve 379 
objectives have had somewhat better buy-in from suppliers and may achieve better 380 
results because they reinforce that culture. (Rains, 2009; Steir, 2009).  381 
 382 
Third-party auditing is a business, where an organization or business pays another firm 383 
to verify whether a supplier is following agreed-upon standards.  While third-party 384 
auditors are not in the same position as regulatory inspectors with respect to policing an 385 
industry – they can provide information upon which buyers can make decisions. Based 386 
on historic examples, audit results have not been well understood by requiring buyers 387 
(Griffith, 2010; Schmit, 2009). It is incumbent on auditing firms and food businesses 388 
commissioning audits to understand the strengths and limitations of any evaluation 389 
process. Companies who blame the auditor or inspector for outbreaks of foodborne 390 
illness should also blame themselves. 391 
 392 
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Abstract 44 
Internal and external food safety audits are conducted to assess the safety and quality of 45 
food including on-farm production, manufacturing practices, sanitation, and hygiene. 46 
Some auditors are direct stakeholders that are employed by food establishments to 47 
conduct internal audits, while other auditors may represent the interests of a second-48 
party purchaser or a third-party auditing agency. Some buyers conduct their own 49 
audits or additional testing, while some buyers trust the results of third-party audits or 50 
inspections.  Third-party auditors, however, use various food safety audit standards 51 
and most do not have a vested interest in the products being sold. Audits are conducted 52 
under a proprietary standard, while food safety inspections are generally conducted 53 
within a legal framework. There have been many foodborne illness outbreaks linked to 54 
food processors that have passed third-party audits and inspections, raising questions 55 
about the utility of both. Supporters argue third-party audits are a way to ensure food 56 
safety in an era of dwindling economic resources. Critics contend that while external 57 
audits and inspections can be a valuable tool to help ensure safe food, such activities 58 
represent only a snapshot in time. This paper identifies limitations of food safety 59 
inspections and audits and provides recommendations for strengthening the system, 60 
based on developing a strong food safety culture, including risk-based verification 61 
steps, throughout the food safety system. 62 
 63 
1.0 Introduction 64 
 65 
Billions of meals are prepared safely each day throughout the world. Much of that food 66 
is deemed safe by some form of verification of practices, known commonly in the 67 
commercial food system as external audits or inspection. Yet when outbreaks of 68 
foodborne illness happen, the results can be emotionally, physically and financially 69 
devastating to the victims and the businesses involved. Many outbreaks involve firms 70 
that have had their food production systems verified and received acceptable ratings 71 
from food safety auditors or government inspectors. 72 
 73 
Food safety audits and inspections are one activity used to verify that a food producer 74 
or individual is following specific guidelines, requirements or rules. Audits involve a 75 
“systematic and independent examination to determine whether quality/safety 76 
activities and related results comply with planned arrangements and whether these 77 
arrangements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives” 78 
(ANZFA, 2001; ANZFA was later morphed into Food Standards Australia New 79 
Zealand). Planned arrangements, as defined by the Australia New Zealand Food 80 
Authority are commonly referred to as standards within the food industry. The 81 
difference between inspections and audits is that an inspection evaluates “conformity 82 
by measuring, observing, testing or gauging the relevant characteristics”(ANZFA, 83 
2001). Audits may be supplemented with microbiological and quality assurance 84 
product testing and process inspections by regulatory agencies or industry to help 85 
ensure adherence to recognized regulations and good manufacturing practices.  86 
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Reactive investigations based on direct consumer complaints or concerns raised 87 
through social media may provide additional information. 88 
  89 
An audit of food safety practices, facilities, documentation and written procedures is 90 
used to gather information regarding food production and processing practices being 91 
followed by a particular producer, identifying areas for improvement and areas that are 92 
deficient (ANZFA, 2001). Audit reports, in theory, serve as the “eyes and ears” for an 93 
organization buying food from a supplier (Weise, 2010). There are several types of 94 
audits, and a variety of audit organizations, each with their own unique or common 95 
food safety guidelines.  96 
 97 
Self-audits are internal audits performed by a food establishment itself.  These 98 
businesses usually have a quality assurance team that leads the internal audits. These 99 
internal audits may have good potential for reducing risk if the methods followed are 100 
those outlined in widely accepted codes and risk assessment guidance documents. 101 
Second-party audits are audits that a downstream company, or buyer, performs on their 102 
supplier. Third-party audits are performed by an outside firm that usually focuses 103 
entirely on verification or standard implementation to ensure that a buyer’s rules are 104 
being followed (Costa, 2010). Third-party audits examine compliance with laws and 105 
codes of practice as well as provide “insight into management controls and 106 
supervision” (Costa, 2010).  107 
 108 
2.0 The role of audits in food safety 109 
 110 
Third-party audits are one part of a multi-factorial approach to food safety. The 111 
popularity of third-party audits has increased corresponding to a shift in food safety 112 
governance away from government regulation and inspection towards the 113 
development of private food safety standards (Busch, 2011).  Standard setting 114 
organizations (e.g. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the British 115 
Retail Consortium (BRC)) include industry consortia, private voluntary associations 116 
and buyers.  There are many different food safety standards available to food producers 117 
and manufacturers even within a single industry segment. While the various standards 118 
are voluntary, demand by buyers essentially makes certification or verification under 119 
these standards de facto mandatory for food companies that want to continue to sell 120 
their product to major retailers (Busch, 2011). This has created a system for enforcing 121 
food safety standards with little burden on taxpayers.  122 
 123 
Costa (2010) argues that third-party audits should focus on strengthening self-audit 124 
methods and operational controls to achieve safer food and maximize benefits. The U.S. 125 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a 2008 report that, while inspectors 126 
or auditors play an active role in overseeing compliance, the burden for food safety lies 127 
primarily with food producers (GAO, 2008). For example, Prevor (2011b) argues that if 128 
a company such as Walmart wanted specific standards for a product, even if it exceeded 129 
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards, the company would demand that 130 
from the auditor -- and get it. Doering (2010) has also said responsibility for verification 131 
primarily lies with industry, given that inspection efforts, even if doubled, would not be 132 
enough to make sure every food item is safe. Third-party audits provide the data upon 133 
which certification and buying decisions are made, and are now a popular choice for 134 
retailers who use them to push the responsibility (and costs) for food safety and quality 135 
back on to the supplier (Steir, 2009).  136 
 137 
Third-party audits are relied upon within a single company or supply chain for a 138 
number of reasons. For some, it is a genuine desire to improve food safety, quality and 139 
sanitation or a way to solve/troubleshoot existing problems (Steir, 2009).  For others it is 140 
a potential marketing advantage or a customer requirement.   The effectiveness of these 141 
audits may link to the motivation behind the audit.  It has been determined that 142 
creating a food safety culture is imperative to an effective food safety risk management 143 
system (Powell et al., 2011; Yiannas, 2008).  Companies with a strong food safety culture  144 
may be more likely to obtain a third party audit because they want to improve 145 
operations, not just because of customer demand.  Companies with a strong food safety 146 
culture are also likely to use audit results as guidance and opportunity to improve their 147 
practices.  Audits -- first- second- or third-party -- are another tool for companies to 148 
enhance safe food production. 149 
 150 
What is not clear is the role of third party audits in reducing the risk of contaminated 151 
food reaching the marketplace and the ability of auditors to identify problems or high 152 
risk operations.  The utility of third party audits has been examined in other industries 153 
as well. A 10-year study on workplace safety on U.S. railroads found that high audit 154 
scores partially correlated with improved legislative compliance but did not necessarily 155 
correspond to improved safety performance (Peterson, 2001). This indicated there were 156 
problems somewhere in the system and that the audit process was not necessarily valid 157 
for that industry. 158 
 159 
3.0 Limitations of audits 160 
 161 
Audit systems, in their current form, have limitations in improving food safety.  There 162 
are no current empirical evaluations that look at the correlation between audit scores 163 
and foodborne illness outbreaks but there is a long and storied history of food safety 164 
failures involving third-party audits and inspections. 165 
 166 
Third-party audits are analogous in many ways to regulatory municipal inspections of 167 
foodservice operations: the effectiveness of both audits and inspections is driven largely 168 
by observational judgment and consistency of the inspector or auditor. Foodservice 169 
inspection is a cornerstone of local public health, yet inspection scores can be poor 170 
predictors of foodborne illness. Jones and colleagues (2004) examined over 160,000 171 
inspections in Tennessee over 7 years and found no difference between scores of 172 
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foodservices associated with outbreaks and those that were not. Similar results were 173 
previously found in Miami-Dade county (Cruz et al., 2001). In Massachusetts, 174 
researchers found that jurisdictions had different inspection criteria, and even within a 175 
given jurisdiction, a risk to one inspector may not be a risk to another (DeNucci 2007). 176 
 177 
Many foodborne illness outbreaks have been linked to farms, processors and retailers 178 
that went through some form of audit certification. The January 2009 outbreak of 179 
Salmonella Typhimurium linked to the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) has been 180 
frequently cited as an example of a failure in the third party auditing system (Busch, 181 
2011; Steir, 2009; Moss and Martin, 2009).  In  January, 2009 PCA recalled over 3,900 182 
peanut butter and other peanut-containing products from more than 350 companies 183 
(FDA, 2009b), 691 people were sickened and nine died across 46 U.S. states and in 184 
Canada (CDC, 2009a). 185 
 186 
Moss and Martin (2009) reported in the New York Times that an auditor with AIB was 187 
responsible for evaluating the safety of products produced by PCA. The peanut 188 
company knew in advance when the auditors were arriving. “The overall food safety 189 
level of this facility was considered to be: SUPERIOR,” the auditor concluded in his 190 
March 27, 2008, report for AIB. A copy of the audit was obtained by the Times. AIB was 191 
not alone in missing the trouble at the PCA plant in Blakely, Georgia. State inspectors 192 
also found only minor problems.  This outbreak and others highlight some of the 193 
limitations of both third party audits and government inspections which are included in 194 
Table I below. 195 
 196 
 197 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is a non-profit foundation managed by the 198 
consumer goods forum (GFSI, 2012) and was launched in May 2000 as a response to the 199 
growing number of private standards. GFSI is a benchmarking system where “all 200 
recognized schemes have a common foundation of requirements which should provide 201 
consistent results, in regard to the common requirements applied during the audit, but 202 
the benchmarked schemes cannot be considered as equal” (GFSI, 2012). One objective of 203 
the initiative is to reduce costs within the system by reducing the number of different 204 
audits a firm requires for their different customers. The success of the GFSI approach 205 
has not been evaluated to date. 206 
 207 
Some auditing companies and standards owners are trying to prevent situations where 208 
a company may have a food safety problem but still obtain a passing grade, through the 209 
application of mandatory or automatic failures (Steir, 2009). The use of auto-failures in 210 
an audit is becoming more common.   High-risk activities are identified, such as the 211 
quality of water used for washing fresh produce, and if the producer is not compliant 212 
with those items, they fail the audit regardless of the final score. Many standards also 213 
allow the auditor to suggest an auto-failure if they identify and document any situation 214 
they deem to be an immediate food safety risk (CanadaGAP, 2012). 215 
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 216 
Audit vs Inspections 217 
Government inspectors have also failed to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks. Five-218 
year-old Mason Jones was one of 157 people – primarily children – who became ill in an 219 
outbreak in South Wales caused by Escherichia coli O157:H7 in September 2005. The 220 
outbreak was traced to the consumption of cooked meats provided to schools by John 221 
Tudor & Son, a catering butcher business. A packaging machine at the business, used 222 
for both raw and cooked meats, was identified as the probable source of contamination 223 
– where E. coli O157:H7 was most likely transferred from raw meat to cooked meat and 224 
was then distributed to four authorities in South Wales for their school meal programs. 225 
Ultimately, 31 people were admitted to hospital and, tragically, Mason Jones died. 226 
 227 
Following the Wales outbreak, a number of mistakes and shortcomings by 228 
environmental health officers were identified – which in no way lessened the primary 229 
responsibility on the supplier of contaminated food --  including the failure of one 230 
officer to verify claims that all food handlers had food hygiene certificates and the 231 
failure by another to insist that steps be taken to prevent cross contamination between 232 
raw and cooked meats during vacuum packaging (Pennington, 2009). Brian Curtis, a 233 
retired senior U.K. Food Standards Agency official, told the inquiry that the Hazard 234 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan reportedly used by John Tudor & Son, 235 
and reviewed by Mr. Curtis at the time of the inquiry, would not ensure the production 236 
of safe food. Mr. Curtis faulted environmental health officers for failing to identify the 237 
deficiencies and weaknesses in the HACCP plan, and for failing to identify and address 238 
the poor hygiene and unsafe food handling practices at the facility. In addition, utilizing 239 
announced, as opposed to unannounced, inspections allowed the butcher to falsify 240 
backlogged cleaning records before such records were due to be viewed by 241 
environmental health officers (Pennington, 2009). 242 
 243 
 244 
In Sept. 2006, 199 people were sickened and at least three died from consumption of 245 
bagged spinach contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 and produced by Earthbound Farms 246 
of California. Samples of river water, wild pig feces, and cattle feces from a nearby 247 
grass-fed cattle operation tested positive for the outbreak strain of E. coli O157:H7 248 
(California Food Emergency Response Team, 2007).  Following the outbreak it was 249 
revealed that the suspect facilities had received a third-party audit of their good 250 
agricultural practices (GAPs) from auditor Primus Labs that did not raise concerns for 251 
the buyer, Dole Foods, to alter any purchasing decisions. This was the 29th documented 252 
outbreak of foodborne illness involving leafy greens in the U.S. Despite decades of 253 
letters and pleading by regulators to the industry to improve microbiological safety 254 
standards, there was no verification that farmers and others in the farm-to-fork food 255 
safety system were seriously incorporating and acting on risk reduction messages, 256 
especially in production fields rather than just processing facilities (Powell et al., 2009). 257 
 258 
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 259 
4.0 Improving audits and inspections 260 
 261 
Food safety auditors and inspectors are an integral part of the food safety system, and 262 
their use will expand in the future, for both domestic and imported foodstuffs. 263 
Supporters of third-party audits argue this type of audit augments the efforts of food 264 
regulatory agencies, such as FDA, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), and 265 
others.  266 
 267 
Auditing can be helpful, in theory. Audit reports, are only useful if the purchaser who 268 
requires them reviews the results, understands the risks addressed by the standards 269 
and makes risk-reduction decisions based on the results. From past examples, there 270 
appears to be a disconnect between what auditors provide (a snapshot) and what 271 
buyers believe they are doing (a full verification of product and process).  272 
 273 
Third-party auditing can also assist regulatory agencies by providing the extra 274 
assessment and data a regulatory agency might not be able to collect as often as 275 
required – but only if the data is shared with regulatory agencies. Audits and 276 
inspections can assist in the development of a food safety culture by dictating criteria 277 
for the sale of goods (Acheson, 2010). The training component for employees is another 278 
use of audits in the daily implementation of food safety practices (AIB International, 279 
2007). Third-party audits also provide “thousands of checks and balances to the food 280 
supply system with no direct cost to taxpayers” (AIB International, 2007). However, 281 
theory and practice can differ. 282 
 283 
Critics see many problems with the general way third-party audits are currently 284 
conducted and have described them as the equivalent of “mail-order diplomas” (Moss 285 
& Martin, 2009).  As far as being the “eyes and ears” for a company buying from the 286 
audited supplier, many problems are apparently missed during visits (Weise, 2010).  287 
It is imperative for the food industry to aggressively take corrective actions and make 288 
third-party audits and inspections more meaningful, more accurate, and to fully 289 
enhance the safety of consumers. 290 
 291 
In an effort to improve the third party audit system, FDA is working to establish 292 
accreditation programs under a new food safety law, to insure the quality of audits 293 
(Karst, 2011). FDA is also trying to make audit results accessible so they can analyze the 294 
results for effectiveness and reliability (Karst, 2011). FDA released guidance for industry 295 
in 2009 regarding voluntary third-party certification programs for foods and feeds 296 
(FDA, 2009a). In this document, it is clearly stated that industry has the primary 297 
responsibility to ensure that food products are safe and meet FDA requirements. The 298 
document outlines recommendations for third-party certification programs such as 299 
qualifications and training for auditors including coursework and field training. These 300 
recommendations, though helpful, are not “legally established responsibilities” and the 301 
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extensive use of the word “should” in the document infers a recommendation rather 302 
than a requirement (FDA, 2009a). 303 
 304 
Third-party audits are only one performance indicator and need to be supplemented 305 
with microbial testing, second-party audits of suppliers and the in-house capacity to 306 
meaningfully assess the results of audits and inspections. Any and all raw product 307 
suppliers should be included in the audit scope. More effective audit systems 308 
incorporate unannounced visits along with supplemental information into their 309 
framework and require extensive documentation of internal audits, regulatory 310 
compliance, laboratory results and raw product certifications. 311 
 312 
Preventive measures such as instilling and enhancing a food safety culture, where there 313 
are shared values throughout the organization that support risk-reduction, may 314 
improve the safety of the food supply by supplying daily reminders, incentives and 315 
food safety priorities in the absence of inspectors or auditors. Improving and 316 
encouraging communication with front-line employees – any food producer is only as 317 
good as its worst front-line staff – can help mitigate high-risk situations such as at PCA, 318 
where employees said the facility was “a dump,” but did not report their concerns to 319 
officials before people became ill and died (Sharp, 2009). Audits, regulatory inspections 320 
and testing are an important part of the food safety system, but alone and individually 321 
they are not enough.  322 
 323 
Education and training are the focus of many food handling behavior interventions. 324 
However, research suggests that the impacts of food handler training programs are 325 
often inconsistent, and program evaluation is rarely conducted (Almanza & Nesmith, 326 
2004; Egan et al., 2007; Frash et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2008). Measuring knowledge 327 
change is a poor indicator of changes in practices.  Yiannas (2008) points out the 328 
limitations of focusing entirely on training as food safety culture indicators and 329 
suggests training is just one factor of a good organization. Conscientious proprietors 330 
provide training and proper tools, remove barriers, and proceed with a focus on 331 
positive food safety behavior. The lack of food safety expertise within an organization 332 
to effectively evaluate and interpret audit or inspection results may compound 333 
problems. Standards applied by auditing firms and regulatory inspections often include 334 
training as a component, but outbreak history suggests that little evaluation of 335 
effectiveness is explored. 336 
 337 
Researchers have suggested that the only reliable measure of effectiveness of food 338 
safety culture-supporting intervention material is through the observation of food 339 
preparation practices (Redmond and Griffith, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Redmond et 340 
al., 2004; Chapman et al., 2010).   341 
 342 
In 2010, beef processor JBS started a trial using video cameras as part of their third-343 
party monitoring and auditing efforts (Crews, 2011). Strategically placed cameras 344 
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recorded footage that could then be observed by auditors around-the-clock and random 345 
audits could then be conducted remotely. Not only does this allow for immediate 346 
feedback, it has also proven an effective training tool for employees, as they can observe 347 
and learn from watching themselves at work (Crews, 2011). Improvement at the pilot 348 
plant was seen in days instead of months and compliance rates consistently exceeded 349 
99%. Errors can be addressed almost immediately before problems develop (Crews, 350 
2011).   351 
 352 
Assessing food-handling practices of staff through internal observations, externally-led 353 
evaluations, and audit and inspection results can provide indicators of a food safety 354 
culture. Results of these evaluations can be used to modify interventions and further 355 
improve the organization’s culture of food safety (Mitchell et al, 2007). 356 
 357 
Since most commercial food establishments are audited or inspected, it remains likely 358 
that any food establishment that becomes associated with a foodborne illness outbreak 359 
will have had some type of audit in the past.  Audits provide only a snap-shot of 360 
information and have inherent limitations based upon stakeholder involvement, 361 
auditor competence, audit scope, and audit system.  362 
 363 
In August 2008, Listeria monocytogenes-contaminated deli meats produced by Maple Leaf 364 
Foods, Inc. of Canada caused 57 illnesses and 22 deaths (Weatherill, 2009). A panel of 365 
international food safety experts convened by Maple Leaf Foods, Inc. to investigate the 366 
source of the deli meat contamination determined that the most probable contamination 367 
source was mechanical meat slicers that, despite cleaning according to the 368 
manufacturer’s instructions, had meat residue trapped deep inside the slicing 369 
mechanisms (Weatherill, 2009). An independent investigative review commissioned by 370 
the Canadian federal government concluded that the focus on food safety was 371 
insufficient among senior management at both the company and the various 372 
government organizations involved before and during the outbreak; that insufficient 373 
planning had been undertaken to be prepared for a potential outbreak; and that those 374 
involved lacked a sense of urgency at the outset of the outbreak (Mason, 2009).  375 
 376 
The specific plant linked to the outbreak received satisfactory marks from federal 377 
inspectors for complying with federal regulatory requirements. They appeared to be 378 
doing everything right. Employees consistently addressed instances of non-compliance 379 
when they were identified. The plant’s management maintained all required records, 380 
ensured that staff training took place, and ensured the established quality assurance 381 
program was followed. At all plants, the company conducted environmental testing 382 
that went beyond regulatory requirements (Weatherill, 2009).  Prior to the outbreak, 383 
Maple Leaf Foods, Inc. conducted more than 3,000 environmental tests annually at the 384 
implicated plant and tested products monthly (McCain, 2009). Although no product 385 
tests revealed the presence of Listeria spp., a number of environmental samples detected 386 
the bacteria in the months before the public was alerted in August to possible 387 
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contamination (CFIA, 2009; McCain, 2009). However, the company failed to recognize 388 
and identify the underlying cause of a sporadic yet persistent pattern of environmental 389 
test results that were positive for Listeria spp. and was not obliged to report these results. 390 
 391 
Audit and inspection information must be leveraged into corrective actions in order to 392 
mitigate risk.  However, the use of audits to help create, improve, and maintain a 393 
genuine food safety culture holds the most promise in preventing foodborne illness and 394 
safeguarding public health. 395 
 396 
A common thread in all of the outbreaks described above is a clear lack of food safety 397 
culture among the implicated companies. In the E. coli outbreak in South Wales, a 398 
public inquiry into the outbreak by Professor Hugh Pennington (2009) found that, in 399 
addition to allowing cross contamination through the operation’s single vacuum 400 
packaging machine, butcher William Tudor encouraged ill employees to continue 401 
working in establishments and preparing meat for sale. Upon review of statements 402 
made by employees and environmental health officers to the police, of video and 403 
photographic evidence, and of management documentation, Professor Chris Griffith 404 
(2010), head of the food research and consultancy unit at the University of Wales 405 
Institute, Cardiff, told the inquiry the culture at the premises was one of little regard for 406 
the importance of food safety but where making and saving money was the priority. 407 
Health code violations at the abattoir were longstanding, repetitive and widely known 408 
among environmental health officers responsible for inspecting the operation Although 409 
foodborne illness may not always be completely preventable, Griffith (2010) concluded 410 
that the risk of a business causing foodborne illness is, to a large extent, a consequence 411 
of its own activities. 412 
 413 
Food safety culture, not only within the company but also within a supply chain should 414 
also be emphasized.  In both the Odwalla and PCA outbreaks, second-party audits were 415 
able to identify problems the third party auditors did not.  Open communication 416 
between suppliers and buyers including expectations and risk management practices is 417 
essential.  Systems where retailers work with their suppliers to help them achieve 418 
objectives have had somewhat better buy-in from suppliers and may achieve better 419 
results because they reinforce that culture. (Rains, 2009; Steir, 2009).  420 
 421 
Third-party auditing is a business, where an organization or business pays another firm 422 
to verify whether a supplier is following agreed-upon standards.  While third-party 423 
auditors are not in the same position as regulatory inspectors with respect to policing an 424 
industry – they can provide information upon which buyers can make decisions. Based 425 
on historic examples, audit results have not been well understood by requiring buyers 426 
(Griffith, 2010; Schmit, 2009). It is incumbent on auditing firms and food businesses 427 
commissioning audits to understand the strengths and limitations of any evaluation 428 
process. Companies who blame the auditor or inspector for outbreaks of foodborne 429 
illness should also blame themselves. 430 
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Table I – Limitations of Third Party Audits 
Audit 
Limitations 
Summary Example 
A snapshot 
in time 
Audits and inspections remain point-in-time 
assessments that represent a small fraction of 
food production time and volume. If conducted 
properly and the results acted upon, audits can 
reveal strengths and weaknesses in a food safety 
program, but cannot guarantee future 
performance. Further, auditors can only examine 
what a company provides, although skilled 
auditors know what to ask for and may be able 
to identify clues to systemic problems.   
PCA outbreak, a federal team of 
investigators later uncovered a 
number of alarming signs at the 
peanut plant including testing 
records from the company itself 
that showed Salmonella in its 
products as far back as June 2007 
(Martin, 2009) 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Reliance on 
an effective 
standard 
The audit is only as effective as the standard 
against which the practices are being measured. 
Standards must be evidence-based, designed to 
address the commodity/product specific risks 
and practices and responsive to changing 
industry practices and new science as it becomes 
available. 
Cantaloupe outbreak, July 2011. 
Previous research had focused on 
Salmonella and current industry 
standards may not be robust 
enough to address risk from 
Listeria.   
Effective 
audit tool 
The audit tool (or audit checklist) must be 
valid. There is no scientific basis for 
certification/validation in audits (Mahshie, 
2009). There is high variability in the quality 
and reliability of audits and many different 
types of audit tools that vary in length, 
complexity, and style. A firm may pass some 
audits but still have a food safety risk factor 
Salmonella in eggs, Iowa, 2010, 
lead to 2,000 illnesses and the 
recall of 500 million eggs. DeCoster 
received a superior rating from AIB 
International, despite audit reports 
that are typically 10-20 pages and 
consider over 300 elements (AIB 
International, 2007). 
Auditor 
competence 
Audits require more than just a checklist, they 
require paying attention and thinking. The 
individual ability of an auditor has a significant 
impact on the outcome of the audit, most third-
party audits look for objective evidence to assess 
compliance, but effective auditors must be able 
to assess risk, particularly in unique situations 
and synthesize the information provided to 
determine effectiveness of the food safety 
management system 
In the aftermath of the PCA 
outbreak, the competency of both 
the auditor and the auditing firm 
were criticized. The auditor of the 
PCA facility was an experienced 
auditor but was an expert in fresh 
produce and was not aware that 
peanuts were susceptible to 
Salmonella (Moss and Martin, 
2009) 
Audit scope 
The audit scope must be broad enough to 
cover all operations, locations and products. 
When a company is presented with different 
price quotes they often choose the cheapest 
one, which is more likely the one with less 
audit time (Pronk, 2011). This reduces cost for 
the firm requesting the audit, and reduces the 
ability of the auditor to see all parts of a 
complex operation as well as the possibility of 
the auditor finding instances of non-
compliance. 
On June 28, 2007, Veggie Booty 
snack food was linked to an 
outbreak of Salmonella. The plant 
that made Veggie Booty had 
received a rating of “excellent” 
from AIB International, raising 
questions about the efficacy of 
auditors and audits, which, in this 
case and others, did not extend to 
ingredient suppliers (Moss & 
Martin, 2009).  
Conflict of 
Interest 
Almost all food producers/retailers require their suppliers to pay for their own audits. 
A company receiving a poor audit may be unwilling to hire that auditor again. Even 
with safeguards in place, auditing bodies still must rely on the honesty of their 
auditors to declare potential conflicts 
Follow-up 
Auditors have no legal authority and cannot demand records, embargo products or 
close an operation (Costa, 2011). Neither the auditor nor the audited company is 
required to report non-compliances, even automatic failures, to regulatory agencies. If 
the buyer does not review the audit report closely, which is often the case (Prevor, 
2011a), they may never know that their supplier had a serious non-conformance. 
 
